REMARKS:

CLAIM REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. 102(B)

In the Office Action, claims 25, 28-30, 33, 34, 38-48 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being anticipated by Wells et al. In response, claim 25 has been amended to more clearly define the present invention. Applicants respectfully submit that Wells does not show all of the limitations in claim 25.

The Examiner takes a position in the Office Action that Wells teaches the network browsing functionality as recited in claim 25. The Examiner points out the paragraphs in column 10, lines 9-25 of Wells. Contrary to the Examiner's determination, there is nothing in Wells that discloses or teaches a network browsing functionality. The designated paragraph first indicates that [a]nimations can be loaded through the external data connection 28 using, by example, Cellular WareTM or some equivalent programming tool. (col. 10, lines 12-16). This uses the external data connection 28, which is shown in Fig. 1 of Wells. The external data connection 28 is a wiring connection for data transport and does not have browsing functionality. Cellular Ware is not a browser, either. It is a program for sending and receiving messages. (See http://mobiles.users.netlink.co.uk/cellware.htm).

The designated paragraph also indicates that [a]nimations can be loaded from the network 32 (FIG. 2) through the RF link by Over the AIR Programming or by Short Message Service (SMS) messages. (col. 10, lines 17-19). Again, there is no indication of "browsing functionality." "Browsing" means "looking over or through an aggregate of things in search of something of interest." (See, e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary). Applicants could not obtain the exact definition of "Over the Air Programming," but it seems to function to deliver programs. Applicants do not believe that it is associated in nay way with browser functionality and. It is clear that Short Message Service has nothing to do with browsing.

Please also note that the browsing functionality recited in claim 25 is for browsing a second network outside the mobile wireless network. Wells is silent about accessing a network outside the mobile wireless network because the network 32 referred to in the above paragraph is a mobile wireless network and not a network outside the mobile wireless network.

Thus, contrary to the Examiner's determination, there is nothing in Wells that discloses or teaches the browsing functionality recited in claim 25. Since Wells is silent about the browsing functionality, it cannot be said that it discloses or teaches the limitation of a viewer that activates the network browsing functionality to selectively access information provider servers located in the second network and receive one or more blocks of screen data from the accessed information provider servers for preview of the received one or more blocks of screen data by a user of the mobile communication terminal.

Also, since Wells is silent about "preview" using the browsing functionality, it necessarily cannot be said to disclose or teach the limitation of a registration control that upon a selection by the user of one block of screen data through the preview of the received one or more blocks of screen data, stores the selected one block of screen data in one of multiple memory areas each correlatable to any one of the at least one standby state.

The browsing functionality of the present invention allows the user to (1) look through collections of screen data on information provider servers in the second network and (2) select one screen data through her preview of the collections and store the data. These features of the present invention are entirely missing from Wells. Therefore, for at least this reason, claim 25 cannot be anticipated by Wells. Since claim 25 is not anticipated by Wells, its dependent claims are also not anticipated by Wells.

CLAIM REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103(A)

Claim 25 was also rejected under 35 U.S.C. as being unpatentable over Evans et al in view of Kuno et al. As discussed in detail in the response to advisory action submitted on July 26, 2005, there is nothing in Kuno and Evans that discloses or teaches the correlatable memory and the dynamic correlation recited in claim 25. Also, as made clear by the above amendment to claim 25, in the present invention, the selections are made by the user. This limitation alone is considered sufficient to distinguish the present invention from Kuno, in which all the images are prestored in a ROM and read out according not to a user selection but to the preprogrammed controller.

Moreover, there is no motivation to combine Kuno and Evans. Kuno teaches that all the images are stored in ROM. In other words, Kuno teaches that the images are stored in a non-changeable memory so that the user cannot, and should not, change the images. In direct contrast to the teaching in Kuno, Evans teaches downloading and storing image data. Thus, as a general matter, Kuno directly teaches against the combination with Evans. Therefore, claim 25 should be patentable over Kuno and Evans.

CLAIM 25 SHOULD BE PATENTABLE OVER WELLS, KUNO AND EVANS

As discussed above, Wells fails to disclose or teach the limitation of a registration control that upon a selection by the user of one block of screen data through the preview of the received one or more blocks of screen data, stores the selected one block of screen data in one of multiple memory areas each correlatable to any one of the at least one standby state. So does Kuno. Kuno only discloses the use of a ROM in which data cannot be rewritten. Evans too fails to teach the limitation. The purpose of storing the downloaded data in the permanent memory in Evans is not to display the data but to prevent redundant downloading. The purpose of the present invention of "storing screen data"

selected through preview in a memory area correlatable to one standby state" is to display the screen data while the terminal is in the standby state. Therefore, Kuno, Evans and wells, even combined, could not teach the present invention.

Respectfully submitted,

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